Can the AU make its current Sudan mission count?

xwhatsapp-strokecopylinkgoogleAdd Al Jazeera on GoogleinfoRSF soldiers secure the area as their commander attends a military-backed tribal rally in East Nile province, June 22, 2019 [Hussein Malla/AP]By Al Jazeera staffPublished On 17 Aug 202617 Aug 2026A delegation from the African Union (AU) began a two-day field visit to Sudan on Sunday, seeking to push efforts towards a ceasefire, improve humanitarian access and revive a political process to end the war that has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions in the past three years.

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is engaging with Sudanese authorities and other parties in the conflict, addressing humanitarian aid access and prospects for a political settlement. The PSC decided earlier this year to undertake the mission to contribute to efforts towards lasting peace and stability.

The delegation arrives at a difficult point in the war. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have regained control of much of the capital, Khartoum while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) remain entrenched across much of Darfur in western Sudan. Kordofan, the region linking central, western and southern parts of the country, has become another major theatre for fighting.

The SAF’s gains around the capital have changed the military balance, but neither side has achieved a decisive victory. That leaves the AU trying to advance diplomacy while both forces still believe they can improve their positions on the battlefield.

The PSC’s priorities are closely connected: pushing the SAF and RSF towards a ceasefire, improving humanitarian access and preserving a political process that can determine Sudan’s future beyond the two armed groups.

The AU has repeatedly called for an inclusive, Sudanese-led political process because stopping the fighting alone would not resolve the crisis that preceded the war.

Sudan’s transition after the 2019 overthrow of longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir collapsed amid disputes between civilian groups and the military. In October 2021, the military dissolved the civilian-military power-sharing arrangement, deepening tensions over the country’s future. The war began in April 2023 after months of rivalry between the SAF and RSF over the proposed transition to civilian rule.

The AU faces a two-track challenge: reducing the fighting enough to allow humanitarian assistance and negotiations, while ensuring any settlement is not simply an agreement between two armed factions over power and territory.

The SAF’s recapture of much of Khartoum strengthened the army’s position throughout central Sudan. But the RSF’s setbacks in the capital did not amount to defeat. It remains a powerful military force with control over large parts of Darfur and the ability to continue fighting elsewhere.

Kordofan has become particularly important because of its location between areas controlled by the two sides and the strategic routes that connect them. Fighting around el-Obeid shows the war remains active, despite the army’s gains around Khartoum.

Control of Kordofan could affect supply routes linking SAF-held areas with western Sudan, while also influencing the RSF’s ability to move fighters and equipment between Darfur and other parts of the country.

That battlefield reality is central to the diplomatic challenge. If either side believed it was close to victory, it would have little incentive to compromise. But neither has been able to decisively defeat the other.

The AU has been involved in Sudan diplomacy since the beginning of the war. In May 2023, the PSC adopted a roadmap calling for a permanent and inclusive ceasefire, humanitarian access, civilian protection and a return to a credible political transition.

The SAF and RSF signed commitments in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in May 2023 on civilian protection, a short-term ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements. But those agreements failed to stop the fighting.

In October 2024, the PSC undertook another field mission to Cairo and Port Sudan, pressing for a ceasefire, humanitarian access and a return to a political process.

The problem has therefore not been a shortage of diplomatic initiatives. The difficulty has been persuading the warring parties to make concessions when both continue to believe they can gain more on the battlefield.

The wider mediation effort has also involved the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African regional organisation, the United Nations (UN) and the United States and Saudi Arabia through the Jeddah process. The AU has repeatedly called for greater coordination between these efforts.

African-led mediation has succeeded in other crises, but Sudan presents a far harder challenge. Unlike Kenya’s post-election crisis, where AU-backed mediation helped produce a power-sharing agreement after the disputed 2007 election, Sudan’s conflict involves two heavily armed forces that control territory and still believe they can improve their positions through force.

The PSC has diplomatic weight, but that does not necessarily give it the leverage needed to compel the SAF and RSF to stop fighting.

Dennis Amachree, a former deputy director of Nigeria’s Department of State Services (DSS), told Al Jazeera that the AU lacks the leverage to compel the two sides to end the war.

“Unfortunately, the AU does not have the leverage on its own to compel the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to stop fighting.”

He argued that the AU lacks “an enforcement mechanism, financial leverage and a standby military force” to pressure the main warring parties.

That leaves the AU dependent on diplomatic pressure and coordination with regional and international actors. Its challenge is to turn political legitimacy into enough pressure to make negotiations more attractive to the SAF and RSF than another offensive.

Benjamin Dowmoh-Doyen of the African Chamber of Content Producers (ACCP) told Al Jazeera that the visit was a step towards an African-led solution.

“This AU visit is a step in the right direction. Africa must own its own affairs and an African-led, African-owned solution is the only path to a lasting resolution in Sudan.”

But African ownership alone will not resolve the deadlock. The AU needs the SAF and RSF to accept that a political process offers something that continued fighting cannot.

The two-day visit will not resolve those problems. Its significance will depend on whether the AU can secure commitments that survive after the delegation leaves and create enough space for negotiations to move forward.

Kabir Amadu, a security analyst in Nigeria and founder of Beacon Consulting Limited, argues that the Sudan war has produced exhaustion rather than a resolution, with both sides receiving enough internal and external support to continue fighting but not enough to secure a decisive victory.

“The AU delegation’s challenge is to convert this battlefield stalemate into diplomatic momentum before it hardens into a permanent partition of Sudan,” he told Al Jazeera.